Contemporary Foreign Relations of India

The Present government proclaimed its policy of ‘Neighbourhood First’ and carried out a masterstroke in inviting SAARC leaders, as well as the President of Mauritius, to attend PM’s swearing-in ceremony (in 2014). Similarly in 2019 swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister of India, leaders of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) have been invited. Special attention has been given in terms of development assistance and the efforts to address contentious issues. Concomitantly, effort has also been to strengthen existing regional multilateral organisations.

  • A major conducive factor is the United States of America considering its strategic interests largely convergent with India’s. This gives the present government an opening to shape the strategic environment in the Indian Ocean region. India’s recent diplomatic initiatives concerning the Indian Ocean island countries for greater regional integration and for achieving regional maritime domain awareness to monitor the security-related developments clearly have US endorsement. However, there are some hints that it might want India to play a more active role on the northern Indian Ocean region, like, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East and, even, South China Sea, where the situation is, indeed, worsening. Quite clearly, this requires a very careful, nuanced handling by the Indian leadership.
  • ‘Howdy, Modi’ (September, 2019) event may be termed as smart diplomacy - depends on its real impact on the future of India-US relations. The event by itself carries immense symbolic value, and the world took note of how far India-US relations have come. This is a positive outcome. On this same line the recent visit of USA President (in February, 2020) is being conducted in his official visit to India namely - “Kem Chho Trump” (which later renamed as ‘Namaste Trump’).
  • The relations with four SAARC neighbours, namely Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal and the Maldives, still remain problematic. SAARC region remains amongst the least integrated although the government is making serious efforts to develop sub-regional cooperation in the East through mechanisms such as BBIN (Bhutan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal) and BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal and Bhutan).
  • Pakistan, undoubtedly, remains India’s biggest diplomatic and security challenge; its systemic fragility is illustrative of the problems India faces in ensuring a secure environment for its national growth; but, as a paradigm, it gives an idea about problems inhering in similar situations in immediate – or, extended – neighbourhood for India. With back-to-back two surgical strikes (in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Region) after Uri and Pulwama attacks (2016 & 2019), has widened the gap between these two nations. Similarly the issue of National Population Register (NPR), National Register of Citizens (NRC) and Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) made the relation with Pakistan very complex and vulnerable.
  • Afghanistan remains a challenge too. Fragile within and facing state-sponsored external threat from Pakistan, a possible state collapse would spawn jihadist terrorism in all directions from which India is unlikely to remain immune. Although not a key interlocutor, Indian diplomacy is active in international efforts to stabilise the country. At a popular level, there is considerable friendship and belief in India’s sincerity in helping the country even though land access remains an issue; there is also an element of uncertainty in the Indian mind about the present President’s policy towards the country given Pakistan’s assurances of help in regard to talks with the Taliban.
  • With Bangladesh, there has been a definite uptick in the relationship although it is also, largely, due to the historical friendship of the present Prime Minister and her domestic politics. The recent issue of Assam NRC and Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019 is anticipated to create some trouble with the smooth relation with Bangladesh.
  • Relationship with Sri Lanka is also seeing a favourable turn due to the electoral victory of the new leadership but a lot will depend upon the progress on the Tamil reconciliation issue.
  • With Myanmar, the relationship has been improving but a certain activation of Naga insurgents from its territory and the likelihood of increase in ‘hot pursuit’ actions could become complications in its growth; the country is the keystone in the ‘Act East’ strategy of the new government.
  • Indian Prime Minister also undertook path-breaking visit to the Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia, for building stronger economic ties, especially through FDIs, energy linkages and for budding security, including counter-terrorism, cooperation. The growing political and security uncertainties in the region, and India’s benign image, have given it a strategically significant opening in the region even though it is not a key power balancer.
  • With the African seaboard countries, the present government has engaged actively with the South African leadership and with the other African leaders at the major India-Africa summit meeting in New Delhi; the cooperation covers spheres such as development assistance, investments, energy education, culture et cetera. Greater Indian presence has balance of power implications and helps tap opportunities for economic cooperation.

Deft Diplomacy

  • The use of phrases like ‘deft diplomacy’ creates an impression that a country can sustainably overcome the limitations placed on it by economic and strategic realities.
  • Sometimes the phrase used is “quiet diplomacy”, at other times “backroom diplomacy” and, sometimes, even more creatively, “deft diplomatic footwork”. The meaning is essentially the same.

Some Recent Examples -

  • The immediate case in point was India’s cooperation with Iran on the one hand and its growing relations with Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia on the other. There are two main reasons why India has been able to perform this tightrope walk and neither of them is deft diplomacy.
  • First, India tends to avoid taking strong positions on any regional dispute in the Middle East. For example, in the latest instance India refused to take a stand on the blockade imposed on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, saying that it was an internal matter for the Gulf Cooperation Council to resolve.
  • To take another example, even as India develops its anti-terrorism cooperation with Israel, it refuses to take a stand on Iran-backed militias that many blame for destabilization of several countries in the region.
  • India’s stands on the war in Syria and on the demands for a homeland for Kurds are also not much to write about.
  • With China, the Deft Diplomacy has helped in developing fairly robust Confidence Building Measures—CBMs on the border but the tensions remain portentous. China is one of India’s largest trade partners and Indian government is wooing Chinese investment in several areas. It is also collaborating on the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar) corridor as well as on several international forums. Its relations remain testy over the China-Pakistan economic corridor running through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir—(POK) and India’s approach to the South China Sea dispute. The relationship is marked with suspicion over China’s policy towards Pakistan, including the construction of the Gwadar port.

Indian government’s major diplomatic push is to showcase India’s economic and technological strengths for attracting FDIs especially at a time when the Chinese economy is experiencing hiccups. The western countries do, however, expect India to move decisively forward on its economic reform agenda which has been promised by the present Indian leadership.