Question : Analyze Indian foreign policy of Non-alignment between 1947 and 1964.
(2004)
Answer : India’s Non-alignment Doctrine as a foreign policy precept was formulated by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. India’s Non-alignment Doctrine was formulated by Nehru as the touchstone of new India’s foreign policy and Nehru steered India in the international community accordingly. Nehru’s passionate obsession to non-alignment led him to establish the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) which he did in the company of leaders like President Tito of Yugoslavia, President Nasser of Egypt, President Sukarno of Indonesia and President Nkrumah of Ghana. They all were leaders of newly independent countries that emerged in the wake of the end of the Second World War and the shake off of colonial rule of the European powers. But this did not deflect the first major criticism of international observers, and especially Western leaders that Nehru as a highly professed democrat had to rely on the dubious company of military dictators and civil autocrats as founding fathers of the NAM. This criticism grew over the years as NAM expanded and most of the members that were added to ultimately reach a figure of over seventy had similar backgrounds, more or less. It also included countries that were openly allied with the Soviet bloc like Cuba.
Nehru, it seems was attempting to craft a Third World Bloc in the bipolar structure of the Cold War era with idealistic hopes that the newly independent under-developed countries as a bloc could emerge as a ginger group in international affairs and extract maximum concessions from the Big Powers. Also, it was hoped that NAM and India in particular, would be able to stay clear of Cold War entanglement and conflicts. In the process, Nehru reveled in occupying the centre-stage of global politics with his high flown idealistic moral posturing. India gradually started losing international relevance in USA and the Western group of advanced industrialized countries as India’s moral hectoring grew and India began adopting double standards in the Cold War standards.
The end of the Cold War and the new international realities that emerged forced India to recognize that non-alignment without political, economic and military muscle was not a workable concept and that if India was to actualize its latent great power potential, it had to shed its ideological obsession with non-alignment and join the international power game in the spirit of the REALISM school of political thought. India today is being widely accepted as an emerging key global player and figuring in the strategic calculus of USA, Russia, China and the EU as a force to reckon with it has achieved this only after discarding the archaic concept of Non-Alignment that it obsessively followed for four decades. Indians of the current generation who would be moving India to its rightful future would naturally question India’s losses as a result of the Non-Alignment Doctrine of India’s foreign policy?
India’s losses inspite of having NAM policy are as follows: It suffered as threat perceptions were de-emphasized and defence preparedness was ignored. It led to India’s military debacle against China in 1962. It also severely impeded the evolution of independent India’s appropriate strategic culture with the obsessive commitment to Pacifism and peace even at the cost of national security interests. It stood confined to NAM countries as political penetration into global political groupings and strategic partnerships was a taboo as per non-alignment precepts and these partnerships were not open to India bound down by such precepts. India was self-prevented from integrating itself into a globalized economy and reaping the benefits of FDI, income generation and jobs generation. Socialistic pattern of economies was the hallmark of NAM countries. The result was poor rates of economic growth and stagnant economies which India could ill-afford for poverty-alleviation for its large population.
Question : Jawaharlal Nehru was the architect of India’s policy of non-alignment. In the light of the statement discuss India’s relations with two ‘power blocks’ between 1947-1964.
(2001)
Answer : The non-aligned movement (NAM) was largely a product of India’s efforts under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. This effort was aimed at organising a collective answer to ‘blockpolitics’ of the great power in international affairs. It also aimed to develop friendly relations among the countries who were trying to free themselves from colonial dominations. The basic thrust of the movement was in favour of peace, disarmament, development, independence, eradications of poverty and illiteracy.
As one of the biggest world powers, the United State of America has played a highly important role in modern international affairs. She sympathised with India in her freedom struggle and was firmly in favour of India attaining independence.
The relations between India and the U.S. fluctuated heavily over the years. It took little interest in this region, till the rise of communism in China. The U.S. promptly announced assistance to India during the Sino-India conflict. But the differences between the two countries continued because of certain factors, one of these being the support and military aid which the U.S. gave to Pakistan. The U.S. also supported Pakistan on Kashmir issue in the Security Council. It also wanted India to gain military alliances sponsored by the U.S. The differences in Indo-America perceptions became widespread on many international issues. While India opposed, as per the norms of the NAM, colonialism of all kinds, the U.S. opposed colonialism only when the independence movement was not dominated by communist forces.
Wherever national movements were dominated by the Communist forces, the U.S.A preferred to remain neutral or supported the colonial power. India’s recognition of People’s Republic of China and its constant efforts to seek China’s admission in the United Nations further embittered the relations between the two. Inspite of these differences, India continued to receive aid from the U.S. in economic and technical fields. During the Indo-China war of 1962, the US offered prompt military assistance. Eisenhower and Kennedy visited India during this period. Despite all these gestures, India did not choose to support the “containment policy” of the US and remained non-aligned.
The soviet Union had supported India’s struggle for independence. On almost all international issues the Soviet Union has been in agreement with India, and on matters concerning India, the attitude of the Soviet Union has been helpful. Nehru’s foreign policy was really appreciated by the Soviet Union. He immediately recognised the People’s Republic of China. India’s support to anti-colonial struggle at the United Nations had gradually brought these two countries closer. India also made efforts to establish ceasefire in Korea and refused to brand people’s Republic of China as aggressor. The most important policy that made the friendship stronger was its refusal to be a part of alliance against the USSR.
On the Kashmir question, the Soviet Union extended firm and steady support to India. An important Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement was concluded on December 2, 1953. At the invitation of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Nehru paid a visit to the Soviet Union. Nehru and Bulganin the Prime Ministers of the Soviet Union, issued a joint Statement on June 23, 1955, affirming their profound faith in the five principles of Pancha Sheel, in the need for disarmament and for true co-existence. Its essence, they stated, was that “States of different social structures can exist side by side in peace and concord and work for the common good”. In response to an invitation by Nehru, Bulganin and Khrushchev and other official representatives of the Soviet Union, visited India in November 1955. Their visit was followed by a Joint India Soviet Statement in which faith in the principles of Pancha Sheel was reaffirmed.
They also issued a Joint Communique on Economic Relations expressing “the desire of the two countries to develop economic co-operation and expand trade relations”. The USSR Supreme Soviet passed a Resolution on December 23, 1955 on the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Burma and Afghanistan to approve their activities as being in full accord with the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union and as contributing to international peace, friendship and co-operation.
The succeeding years have been marked by “consolidation and enlargement” of India Soviet friendship. There was another Indo-Soviet tradeagreement on 16th November, 1958.
A Joint-Soviet Statement was issued on February 6, 1960, in which both sides expressed their gratification at the development of relations between India and the Soviet Union in a spirit of goodwill and friendship as a result of their common peaceful coexistence and active pursuit of peace. They stressed the importance of disarmament as an essential prerequisite to permanent and lasting peace and to the banishment of the fear of war.
The Soviet Union supported India on the Goa issue. During the Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union and India took up a similar stand to condemm aggression. The Soviet Union provided $ 500 million for the Third Five year plan and supplied oil when the western companies were unwilling to do so.
In 1962, when the Chinese invaded India the Soviet Union not only expressed sympathy for India but helped India to manufacture MIG Fighter Planes. The Soviet leaders expressed their support for Indian policy of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence.
Question : “With great skill and masterful diplomacy and using both persuasion and pressure, Sardar Vallabhbahi Patel succeeded in integrating the hundreds of princely states with the Indian Union.” Discuss.
Answer : The variegated pattern of the British Congress of India and the different stratagems through which the various parts of the country was brought under colonial rule had resulted in two-fifths of the subcontinent being ruled by Indian princes. The areas ruled by the Indian princes included Indian States like Hyderabad, Mysore and Kashmir that were equal in size to many European countries, and numerous small states who counted their population in the thousands.
The common feature was that all of them, big or small, recognized the paramountcy of the British government. In return, the British guaranteed the princes against army threat to their autocratic power, internal or external most of the princely states were run as unmitigated aristocracies, with absolute power concentrated in hands of ruler. The burden of land tax was heavy and there was usually much less of the rule of law and civil liberties. The vast majority of the states were the bastions of economic, social, political and educational backwardness.
Ultimately, it was the British government that was responsible for the situation in which the Indian states found themselves in. As the national movement grew in strength, the princes were increasingly called upon to play the role of bulwarks of reaction. Any sympathy with nationalism was looked upon with extreme disfavour.
Many a potential reforms among the rulers was gradually drained of initiative by the constant surveillance and interference exercised by the British resident. The advance of the national movement in British India, and the accompanying increase in political consciousness about democracy, responsible government and civil liberties had an inevitable impact on the people of the states. In the first and second decade of the twentieth century, runaway terrorists from British India seeking shelter in the states became agents of politicization. A much more powerful influence was exercised by the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movement. Around this time, and under its impact, numerous local organizations of the states people came into existence. The process came to a head in December 1927 with the counting of All India States People Conference under initiative of Balwant Mehta, Maniklal Kothari and G.R. Abhyankar.
With the impending lapse of paramountcy the question of future of the princely states became a vital one. The more ambitions rulers or their dewans (like Hyderabad, Bhopal, Travancore) were dreaming of an independence which would keep them as autocratic as before and such hopes received considerable, encouragement from the government of India’s political department under Conrad Cornfield till Mountbatten enforced a more realistic policy.
Meanwhile, a new upsurge of the states people’s movement had begun in 1946-47, demanding everywhere political rights and elective representation in the Constituent Assembly and containing in some places considerable socially radical possibilities as in case of Travancore and Hyderabad. The congress criticized the cabinet mission plan for not providing for elected members from states. Nehru presided over Udaipur and Gwalior session of the All India States Peoples Conference (December 1945 and April 1947) and declared at Gwalior that States refusing to join the Constituent Assembly would be treated as hostile.
But verbal speeches and threats apart, the congress leadership or more precisely, Sardar Patel who took charge of the new states department in 1947 together with V.P. Menon who became secretary tackled the situation in what had become the standard practice of the party: using popular movement as a leer to extort concessions from princes while simultaneously restraining from or even using force to suppress them once the price had been brought to heel as in Hyderabad. The pattern had already been indicated in Kashmir in 1946 when Sheikh Abdullah was arrested for leading quit Kashmir movement against unpopular and despotic Maharaja. Nehru rushed to Kashmir leader’s support and was even arrested for defying ban on entry in state. Patel, however, very soon opened negotiations with the Kashmir’s Prime Minister, which enthusiastic in Maharaja of Kashmir’s accession to India after raiders from Pakistan invaded the state in October 1947. Patel assured the princes: The Congress was no enemies of the princely order but on the other hand wish they and the people under their aegis are prosperity, contentment and happiness.
The incorporation of Indian states took place in two phases, with a skillful combination of baits and threats of mass-pressure in both. By 15 August 1947, all states except Kashmir, Junagarh and Hyderabad had agreed to sign an instrument of Accession with India acknowledging central authority over the three areas of defence, external affairs and communications. The princes agreed to this fairly easily for so far they were surrendering only what they had, never had and there was no change as yet in internal political structures. The much more difficult process of ‘integration’ of stgates with neighbouring provinces or into new units like Kathiawar union, Vindhya and Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan or Himachal Pradesh, along with internal constitutional changes in states which for some years retained their old boundaries (Hyderabad, Mysore, Cochin-Travancore) was also accomplished within the remarkably short period of hitu more than a year. Here the principal bait offered was that of very generous privy pluses, while some princes were also made into governors or Rajapramukhs. The rapid unification of India is certainly Sardar Patel’s greatest achievement. But we must not forget the considerable role played here too, by the existence of or at least the potential presence of mass pressures. Thus, the eastern states union formed by recalcitrant princes assumed in December 1947 in the fare of powerful praja mandal agitations in Orissa states like Nilgiri, Dhankamal and Talcher. Junagarh in Kathiawar whose Muslims ruler tried to join Pakistan was brought to heel by combination of popular agitation with Indian police action. The Congress supporters in Mysore launched “Mysore Chalo” agitation in September, 1947. V.P. Menon persuaded the Travancore Dewan to give up his dream of separate state. Thus, owing to skills of Sardar Patel, the princely states acceded to Indian Union.
