Question : Elaborate Nyaya-Mimamsa debate on Pramayavada.
(2015)
Answer : Pramanyavada relates to the theory of validity of knowledge. It tells whether knowledge is itself valid or requires external sources to validate it. There are two kinds of validity namely Svatah-pramanyavada and Pratah-pramanyavada. Svatah-pramanyavada holds knowledge to be intrinsically valid. This view is supported by Mimamsa. Mimamsa holds that knowledge cannot be validated by any other knowledge. It further holds, validity arises from the essential nature of the causes of knowledge. Whereas Pratah-pramanyavada holds knowledge ....
Question : Can arthapatti (postulation) be reduced to anumana (inference)? Discuss it from the Mimamsa point of view.
(2014)
Answer : In Nyaya school there are four Pramanas: Pratyaksha (perception), Anumana (inference), Upamana (comparison) and Shabda (testimony of scriptures). In Mimamsa Darshan, there are two more pramanas, namely Anupalabdhi and Arthapatti. Pravakara Mishra accepted only the five pramanas - perception, inference, comparison, testimony and Arthapatti.
The word ‘Arthapatti’ consists of two words:
“Artha “: Fact and “ Apatti “: Assumption.
When there is conflict between two pramanas, a conclusion has to be postulated which reconciles the conflict.
Let us see ....
Question : Evaluate Prabhakara Mimamsaka’s arguments for accepting sruti as pramana.
(2013)
Answer : The Shruti is treated as the supreme and ultimate authority. The authentic Smriti literature has had its basis in the shruti. Whenever a difference arises between the shruti and the smiriti, the shruti statement is accepted as the final word. Needless to say, the Smriti is to be interpreted in consonance with the Shruti.
From time to time the Smriti might undergo modifications, but the Shruti can not be altered at all. And, Prabhakar says “One ....
Question : Why does Mimamsa gives utmost importance to SHABDA-PRAMANA the verbal testimony? Is it anything to do with Vedas? Give your comments.
(2012)
Answer : Mimamsa gave utmost importance to Shabda-Pramana i.e. verbal testimony, because through this, Mimansa also clarifies the authen-ticity of Vedas.
An intelligible sentence yields knowledge except when it is known to be the statement of an unreliable person (Anaptavakya). This is known a as verbal testimony. There are two kinds of authority-personal and impersonal. The first consists in the written or spoken testimony of some person. The second denotes the authority of the Vedas. Again, authority may ....
Question : Anuplabdhi as a Pramana.
(2008)
Answer : Anupalabdhi is a proof of knowledge from negation or absence of a thing. Since Brahman is everywhere present and nowhere absent, this proof does not deserve consideration. Anupalabdhi is a proof of knowledge from negation or absence of a thing. In addition to the above pramanas Kumarila admits a fifth kind of pramana, viz. anupalabdhi for the perception of the non-existence of a thing.
Kumarila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no ....
Question : Nature of Shabda pramana.
(2007)
Answer : Shabda Pramana has got the greatest importance in Mimamsa. Testimony is verbal authority. It is the knowledge of supra sensible objects which is produced by the comprehension of the meanings of words. Kumarila divides testimony into personal (pauruseya) and impersonal (apauruseya). The former is the testimony of the Veda (Vedavakya). It is valid in itself. It has intrinsic validity. But the former is not valid in itself. Its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character ....
Question : What is Svatahpramanyavada according to Mimamsaka? Is their explanation of error consistent with it? Discuss fully.
(2002)
Answer : The Mimamsa upholds the theory of Svatahpramanyavada which may be translated as the theory of self-validity or intrinsic validity of knowledge. All apprehension is intrinsically valid. All knowledge is valid by itself. It is not validated by any other knowledge. Its validity arises from those very causes from which knowledge itself arises. Validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of the cause of knowledge. It is not due to any extraneous conditions. Prabhakara and ....
Question : Kumarila Bhatt’s explanation of perceptual error.
(2001)
Answer : Kumaril Bhatt’s theory of perceptual error is opposed to that of Prabhakar’s explanation of the theory of error though he agrees with him in maintaining the intrinsic validity of knowledge. But he maintains the logical distinction between truth and error whereas Prabhakar does not admit error in the logical sense. Kumaril recognizes error as such and regards it as apprehension and not as mere non apprehension. He further holds that error is a single psychosis, ....
Question : The Purva Mimamsa Concept of Khyati.
(1999)
Answer : There are two different views in the purva mimamsa concept of khyati or theory of error, given by Prabhakar and Kumarila bhatt. Prabhakara in strict accordance with his view of intrinsic validity of knowledge does not admit error in the logical sense. All knowledge is valid par se. To experience is always to experience validity. Error, therefore, is only partial truth. It is imperfect knowledge. All knowledge, as knowledge, is quite valid, though all knowledge ....
Question : Svatah-pramana and paratah-pramanya.
(1997)
Answer : The controversy between the Mimamsaka and the Naiyayika regarding the validity of knowledge has become classic. Nyaya advocates the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge called Paratahapramanyavad. According to it knowledge is neither valid nor invalid in itself. It is neutral. The question of its validity or invalidity arises only after knowledge has arisen. The nature of knowledge is its correspondence with object. And the test of truth is fruitful activity (Samvadipravartti). If knowledge leads ....
Question : Arthapatti.
(1996)
Answer : Prabhakara and Kumarila both unlike the Naiyayaika, admit Arthapatti as an independent means of valid knowledge. It is presumption or postulation or implication. It is the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two apparently inconsistent perceived faces. If Devadatta is alive and he is not in his house we presume that he is elsewhere. Being alive and not being in the house are two perceived facts of being elsewhere? It Devadatta is ....
Question : While describing the chief tenents of the Mimamsa metaphysics, critically consider its view in respect of the reality of the phenomenal world.
(1996)
Answer : The Mimamsaka is a pluralistic realist. He believes in the reality of the external world and of the individual souls. There are innumerable individual souls, as many as there are living bodies, plus the bodiless liberated souls. There are innumerable atoms and the other eternal and infinite substances. Mimamsa believes in the Law of Karma, in Unseen Power (apurva), in heaven and hell, in liberation and in the ultimate authority of the eternal authorless Veda. ....
Question : Sabda Pramana.
(1995)
Answer : Sabha-Pramana has also got the importance in Indian philosophy. Among the Indian schools of philosophy it has got the greatest importance in Mimamsa and Nyaya Schools. Testimony is verbal authority. It is the knowledge of supra-sensible objects which is produced by the comprehension of the meanings of words. Kumarila divides testimony into personal and impersonal. The former is the testimony of the trustworthy. Person, the latter is the testimony of the Veda. It is valid ....
