Question : Strawson’s distinction between ‘M’ and ‘P’ predicates.
(2015)
Answer : Strawson distinguishes between two sorts of ‘predicate’ or descriptive term: P-predicates and M-predicates. P (Psychological?) predicates are those we apply only to conscious beings, such as ‘thinks’, ‘is worried’, ‘hoped’. M (Material?) predicates, such as ‘was heavy’, ‘falls’, ‘is noisy’ are those applied also to material objects which we do not regard as conscious. (We may speak also of P-properties and M-properties, as the features which these predicates pick out.) What follows takes the form ....
Question : Elucidate Quine’s arguments to show that analyticity is not synonymity.
(2015)
Answer : Quine point out that analyticity has been defined by a number of linguistic concepts but either these concepts are themselves as unclear as the concept of analyticity itself or they involve a sort of circularity. They involve circularity because the concepts in terms of which the analyticity is defined are members of the same family.
Quine argues that analyticity can be explained in terms of synonymy. A proposition is analytic if the subject and predicate ....
Question : How far are Quine’s arguments in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ justified? Discuss.
(2014)
Answer : Quine’s two ‘dogmas of empiricism’ criticises the central ideas behind logical positivism, and provides the outline of a new philosophical view which he holds retains the spirit of positivism while avoiding its fundamental problems. Quine rejects first the dogma that there is a sharp ‘analytic/synthetic’ distinction in sentence meaning, and the second dogma radical reductionism, holding each statement’s meaning is determined by a set of confirming/disconfirming experiences.
Let us consider firstly Quine’s grounds for rejecting the ....
Question : Explain and evaluate Strawson’s arguments for his conception of the nature of a person.
(2013)
Answer : In 1959, Strawson published his second book ‘Individuals’. In the Introduction to ‘Individuals’ he says, about material bodies and persons, “in our conceptual scheme as it is, particulars of these two categories are the basic or fundamental particulars, that the concepts of other types of particular must be seen as secondary in relation to the concepts of these.” We are familiar with Strawson’s notion of basic particulars as those which can be identified without the ....
Question : Explain critically Quine’s rejection of the analytic synthetic distinction and his subsequent philosophical arguments.
(2012)
Answer : Contemporary western philosopher Quine refuted the analytical and synthetic distinction among the statement. Before Quine, empiricists thinkers accepted two kinds of truths, viz. analytical truth and the synthetic truth. The analytical truth depends upon the words used in the statement, whereas the basis of synthetic statement is experience.
Quine refused to accept the wordly difference in between these two. While refuting the difference, Quine based his parameter on the definition of analy-tical statement.
Those who accept the ....
Question : Is Strawson’s concept of a person a refutation of Hume’s concept of self? Discuss.
(2010)
Answer : A person is self. A self is what is referred to by “I”- the first person pronoun, on many views a self simply is a person, an embodied, conscious being. Descartes disagrees and Hume didn’t acknowledge the distinction. Srawson claims to address the issue of solipsism. He argues that “I” must refer to a person that is essentially something embodied and to a person among persons. The solipsist cannot use “I” without a significant, contrasting ....
Question : What are Quine’s objections with regard to the verification theory of meaning?
(2009)
Answer : Verificationists need not be logical positivists. Willard Van Orman Quine is a famous example of a verificationist who does not accept logical positivism, on grounds of semantic holism. He suggests that, for theoretical sentences as opposed to observation sentences, meaning is “infected by theory”. That theoretical sentences are reducible to observation sentences is one of the ‘dogmas of empiricism’ he rejects as incompatible with semantic holism. Now Quine considers the verification theory of meaning. He ....
Question : State and discuss Strawson’s theory of person.
(2007)
Answer : Before Strawson the concept of body and mind was a matter of debate in the traditional European philosophy. Strawson raised some basic questions the concept of body and mind and concluded some new concepts regarding notion of an individual. There are two questions around which Strawson’s theory of persons revolves. They are:
Why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?
Why are states of consciousness ascribed to the same things that we ascribe physical ....
Question : Quine’s criticism on analytic-synthetic distinction.
(2005)
Answer : In 1951, W.V. Quine published his famous essay in which he argued that the analytic-synthetic distinction is untenable. Quine took the distinction to be the following: First, analytic propositions - propositions grounded in meanings, independent of matters of fact. Second, synthetic propositions - propositions grounded in fact. In short, Quine argues that the notion of an analytic proposition requires a notion of synonymy, but these notions are parasitic on one another. Thus, there is no ....
Question : Civuil service Strawson’s notion of person as a primitive.
(2003)
Answer : Strawson’s theory of person suggests that a person as a concept that cannot be analysed further in a certain way or another. That means: “the concept of person is the concept of a type of entity, such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. In other words, the states of consciousness cannot be ascribed at all,
unless they are ascribed ....
Question : Quine’s attack on Analytic – Synthetic Distinction.
(2002)
Answer : In 1951, W.V. Quine published his famous essay in which he argued that the analytic-synthetic distinction is untenable. Quine took the distinction to be the following: First, analytic propositions - propositions grounded in meanings, independent of matters of fact. Second, synthetic propositions - propositions grounded in fact. In short, Quine argues that the notion of an analytic proposition requires a notion of synonymy, but these notions are parasitic on one another. Thus, there is no ....
Question : Examine Quine’s critique of the linguistic theory of necessary proposition.
(2001)
Answer : According to Quine, the acquisition of language is a process of conditioning the performance of verbal behavior. Words for concrete or abstract objects may be learned by a process of reinforcement and extinction, whereby the meaning of words may become more clearly understood. Quine argues that the meaning of a sentence as a stimulus to verbal behavior is defined by what type of response it arouses in the listener or reader. A sentence may have ....
