Question : Can qualities exist without substance? Substantiate your view in the light of nyaya-buddhism controversy?
(2010)
Answer : In Nyaya guna is quality. Unlike substance, it cannot exist without independently by itself and possess no quality or action. It inheres in a substance and depends for its existence on the substance and is not a constitutive cause of anything. It is called an independent reality because it can be conceived, thought and named independently of a substance where it inheres. The qualities are therefore called objective entities. They are not necessarily eternal. They include both material and mental qualities. They are static and permanent feature of a substance while action is a dynamic and transient feature of a substance. A quality is therefore different from substance and action. In Nyaya the substance is defined as the substratum where actions and qualities inhere and which is the coexistent material cause of the composite things produced from it.Buddhism on the other hand opines that qualities can exist without substance. It is stream of vigyana and it can exist and go ahead even if there is no substance as such. According to Buddhism everything is transient and an object exists for a moment. Hence a substance cannot remain for more than a moment. But even if it disappears its qualities remain and are passed on to the next entity. Moreover a quality is what and the way we perceive it. Each and every object has its own typical quality which is beyond our perception. What we perceive is the superimposition of our own though and perception about the object or qualities we come in touch with. Hence the quality is not the quality an object has but it is we who posit the qualities on the object when it comes in to contact with our sense organs.
Question : Explain the reasons for introducing the notion of extraordinary perception in nyaya epistemology.
(2010)
Answer : According to Gautama perception is uncontradicted knowledge which arises out of the proximity of object and sense organ, it is distinct and is unrelated to any name. According to this view, perception is that form of knowledge which results form the contact or nearness between the objects and the sense organ and which is apparent and real knowledge. The Nyaya philosophers have recorgnised six kinds of proximity, Sanjog, Samyak Samavaya, Sanyukt Saimaveta Samavaya, Samaveta Samavaya and Vishesya bhava etc. This analysis of perception does not take into account the extra ordinary and intuitive perception because there can be no knowledge of them without contact with senses. Knowledge of pleasure and pain etc. occurs without ostensible contact with the sense organs. In this way, the general characteristic of perception is not contact with the senses but rather immediate cognition. Perceptual knowledge of an object occurs only when there is cognition of it, meaning there by that in perception, knowledge occurs without any past experience or inference. Perception has been analyzed in various ways. From one angle perception has two distinctions - ordinary and extraordinary. In ordinary perception knowledge results from the contact of the sense organs with the object. Extraordinary perception provides immediate knowledge even with the sense. Ordinary perception also admits of two distinctions- external and internal. External perceptions have five distinct types concerning with the five senses - visual, tactual, auditory, gustatory and factory. In internal perception, the actual contact between the object and the mind produces knowledge of the pleasure, pain, hatred, morality immorality etc. In this way, the two kinds of perception, internal and external, admit of six distinctions. From another view point, ordinary perception has three distinctions- perception of classes complication and intuitive.
Three modes of extra ordinary Perception:
Question : Hetvabhasa according to Nyaya
(2009)
Answer : The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving from particular to particular via generality. It has five steps, as in the example shown:
There is fire on the hill (called Pratija, required to be proved)
Because there is smoke there (called Hetu, reason)
Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. in a kitchen (called Udaharana, example of vyapti)
The hill has smoke that is pervaded by fire (called Upanaya, reaffirmation or application)
Therefore there is fire on the hill (called Nigamana, conclusion)
In Nyaya terminology for this example, the hill would be called as paksha (minor term), the fire is called as sadhya (major term), the smoke is called as hetu, and the relationship between the smoke and the fire is called as vyapti(middle term). Hetu further has five characteristics: (1) It must be present in the Paksha, (2) It must be present in all positive instances, (3) It must be absent in all negative instances, (4) It must not incompatible with the minor term or Paksha and (5) All other contradictions by other means of knowledge should be absent. The fallacies in Anumana (hetvbhasa) may occur due to the following:
(i) Asiddha: It is the unproved hetu that results in this fallacy. [Paksadharmata]
(ii) Savyabhichara: This is the fallacy of irregular hetu.
(iii) Satpratipaksa: Here the hetu is contradicted by another hetu. If both have equal force, then nothing follows. ‘Sound is eternal, because it is audible’, and ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced’. Here ‘audible’ is counter-balanced by ‘produced’ and both are of equal force.
(iv) Badhita: When another proof (as by perception) definitely contradicts and disproves the middle term (hetu). ‘Fire is cold because it is a substance’.
(v) Viruddha: Instead of proving something it is proving the opposite. ‘Sound is eternal because it is produced’.
Question : Discuss critically Nyaya notion of Vyapti.
(2008)
Answer : Vyapti is the basis of anumana. Vyapti refers to the unconditional and permanent relationship between hetu and sadhya. Inference (anumana) is the second means of proof (pramana) and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or linga which is associated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically called linga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been made (the hill in this example) is called paksha, and the term “fire” is called sadhya. To make a correct inference it is necessary that the hetu or linga must be present in the paksha, and in all other known objects similar to the paksha in having the sadhya in it (sapaksha-satta), i.e., which are known to possess the sadhya (possessing fire in the present example).
The linga must not be present in any such object as does not possess the sadhya (vipaksha-vyavritti absent from vipaksha or that which does not possess the sadhya). The inferred assertion should not be such that it is invalidated by direct perception (pratyaksha) or the testimony of the shastra (abadhita-vishayatva). The linga should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way could also be possible (asat-pratipaksha).
The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against inference by the Carvakas, that inferential arguments are valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity of nature in two relations, viz. tadatmya (essential identity) and tadutpatti (succession in a relation of cause and effect). Tadatmya is a relation of genus and species and not of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity (tadatmya). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.
We perceive in many cases that a linga (e.g. smoke) was associated with a lingin (fire), and had thence formed the notion that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we perceived that there was smoke in under hill, we remembered the concomitance (vyapti) of smoke and fire which we had observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill, which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the linga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its concomitance with fire (tritiya-linga-paramarsha) is thus the cause (anumitikarana or anumana) of the inference (anumiti).
The concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called vyapti. When this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with those having fire, it is called bahirvyapti; and when it refers to the conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was observed, it is called antarvyapti. The Buddhists since they did not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyapti view of concomitance to bahirvyapti as a means of inference.
Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign (hetu) with the signate (sadhya), how are we to assure ourselves in each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (vyaptigraha) had been correct and the observation of concomitance had been valid. The Mimamsa school held, as we shall see in the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire. But Nyaya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire should be a case of absence of smoke.
The former is technically called anvayavyapti and the latter vyatirekavyapti. But even this is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It may be that one might never have observed smoke without an antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately followed by the disappearance of smoke then only could we say that there was any relation of concomitance (vyapti} between the ass and the smoke. But of course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu, and there might be some other condition (upadhi) associated with the hetu which was the real hetu.
Thus we know that fire in green wood (ardrendhana) produced smoke, but one might doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced smoke, but there was some hidden demon that did it. But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would have to be dispensed with (vyaghata). Thus such doubts as lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or unsettle the notion of vyapti or concomitance at which we had arrived by careful observation and consideration. The Buddhists and the naiyayikas generally agreed as to the method of forming the notion of concomitance or vyapti (vyaptigraha), but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance always depended on a relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence, whereas Nyaya held that neither the relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was quite a number of other types of inference which could not be brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening other things would happen could certainly exist, even without the supposition of an identity of essence.
But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyaya holds however that though different causes are often found to produce the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its other attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the rise of water in the river.
Thus from the flooding of the street of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances, the special manner in which the water flows by small rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we see that Nyaya relied on empirical induction based on uniform and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists assumed a priori principles of causality or identity of essence.
Question : Samanya in Vaishesika.
(2008)
Answer : Vaisheshika, also Vaisesika is one of the six Hindu schools of philosophy (orthodox Vedic systems) of India. Historically, it has been closely associated with the Hindu school of logic, Nyaya. The Vaisesika is primarily a metaphysics system of thought which classifies all beings into seven categories, and postulates that all objects in the physical universe are reducible to a finite number of atoms. Vaisesika is a system of pluralistic realism, which emphasizes that reality consist in difference.
The Vaisesika School admits the reality of spiritual substances the soul and God and also the Law of Karma therefore, its atomism is not materialism. Generality (samanya) is class concept, or class-essence, comparable to the “universal” of European Scholastic philosophy. It is the universal quality or characteristic possessed by all the different individual members of a particular class. It is described as “eternal, one, and residing in many.” It is one, though it inheres in many individuals; it is eternal, though the individuals in whom it inheres are subject to birth and death, production and destruction. The universal and the particular are not simple subjective concepts of the human mind; they are objective realities. The samanya reside in substances, qualities and actions.
They are of two kinds, higher and lower, with the higher samanya referring to “being” (sattâ), which includes everything and is not included in anything. All other generalities are “lower” because they cover only a limited number of things. Only one universal inheres in all members of a class. A quality or action that pertains to only one individual is not considered a universal. Nyaya and Vaisesika regard particulars and universals as separately real.
Question : Explain fully Nyaya’s Asatkaryavada.
(2007)
Answer : The basic question involved in any theory of causation is: does the effect pre exist in its material cause? Those who answer this question in the negative are called Asatkaryavadivs, while those who answer it in the affirmative are called Satkaryarvadins. According to the former the effect is a new creation, a real beginning. The effect (Karya) does not pre exist (asat) in its material cause. Otherwise, there would be no sense in saying that it is produced or caused. It the pot already exists in the clay and the cloth in the threads and curd in milk, then why should the potter exert himself in producing the pot out of the clay and why should not the threads serve the purpose of the cloth and why should not milk taste like crude? Moreover, its production would be its repeated birth which is nonsense. Nyaya, vaishesika, Hinayaha, Buddhism Materialsim and some followers of Miamsa believe in Asatkaryavada, which is also known as Arambhavada, i.e, the view that production is a new beginning. Materialism believes in Savabhavavada; Hinayana Buddhbism in Anitya paramanuvada or Ksanbhangavada and Naya Vaishesika and followers of Mimamsa in Nitya paramanu Karanvada. The Sattakaryavadins on the other hand believe that the effect is not a new creation but only an explicit manifestation of that which was implicitly contained in its material cause. Here, another important question arises: Is the effect a real transformation or an unreal appearance of its cause?
Those who believe that the effect is real transformations of its cause are called Parinamvadins; while those who believe that it is an unreal appearance are called Vivartavadins. Sankhya, Yoga and Ramanuja believe in Parinamavada. The view of Samkhya Yoga is called Prakrti parinamavada, while the view of Ramanuja is called Brahma Paribanavada. Shunyavada, Vijnavada and Shankara believe in Vivartavada. Their view may be respectively called Shumya, Vivaartavada, Vijnanavada and Brahmanvivartavada. The view of Jainism and of Kumarila may be called Sadasatkaryavada because according to them the effect is both real as well as unreal before its production real as identical with the cause and unrea as a model change there of, though ultimately both incline towards Parinamavada.
Samkhya believes in Satakaryavada. All material effects are the modification of Prakrti. They pre exist in the eternal bosom of Prakrti and simply cause out of it at the time of creation and return to it at the time of dissolution. There is neither new production nor utter destruction. Production means development or manifestation: destruction means envelopment or dissolution. Production is evolution; destruction is involution. Samkhya gives five arguments in support of Satakaryavada:
If the effect does not pre exist in its cause, it becomes a mere non entity like the hair’s horn or the sky flower and can never be produced.
The effect is only a manifestation of its material cause, because it is invariably connected with it.
Everything cannot be produced out of everything; this suggests that the effect, before its manifestation, is implicit in its material cause.
Only an efficient cause can produce that for which it is potent. This again mean that the effect, before its manifestation, is potentially contained in its potential. Were it not so, then curd should be produced out of water and cloth out of reads, and oil out of sand particles.
The effect is the essence of its material cause and as such identical with it. When the obstructions in the way of manifestation are removed, the effect naturally floods out of its cause. The cause and the effect are the implicit and the explicit stage of the same process. The cloth is contained in the threads, the oil in the oil-seeds, and the curd in the milk. The effect pre exist in its material cause.
Thus Satkaryavada challenges the views of Asatkaryavada of Nyaya philosophy. Nyaya philosophy emphasizes that an effect is defined as the counter entity of its own prior non existence. It is the negation of its own prior negation. It comes its being and destroys its prior non existence. It was non-existent before its production. It did not pre exist in its cause. It is a fresh beginning, a new creation. This Nyaya-Vaishasika view of causation is directly opposed to the Samkhya yoga and Vedanta view of Satkaryavada. The effect is non-existent before its extension and is a new beginning, a fresh creation an epigenist. It is distinct from its cause and can never be identical. It is neither an appearance nor a transformation of the cause. It is newly brought into existence by the operation of the cause.
Question : Explain Nyaya theory of Pramanas.
(2006)
Answer : Nyaya means argumentation and suggests that the system is predomisnantly intellectual, analytic logical and epistemological. In the Nyaya philosophy valid knowledge is produced by the four valid means of knowledge perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Gautam defines perception as non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense organs with the objects, which is not associated with a name and which is well defined. This definition of perception excludes divine and yogic perception which is not generated by the intercourse of the sense organs with the objects. Hence Viswanatha has defined perception as direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. This definition includes ordinary as well as extra-ordinary perception and excludes inference, comparison and testimony. Perception is a kind of knowledge and is the attribute of the self. Ordinary perception presupposes the sense organs, the objects the manas and the self and their mutual contacts. The sense organs are derived from the elements whose specific qualities of smell, taste colour, touch and sound are manifested them. The mana is the mediator between the self and the sense-organs.
The second kind of knowledge is annuman or inferential or relational and its means is called anumana or inference. It is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is mediate and indirect and arises through a ‘mark’, the middle term (linga or hetu) which is invariably connected with the major term (Sadhya). It is knowledge which arises after (anu) other knowledge. Invariable concomitance (Vyapti) is the nerve of inference.
The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called paramasha. And inference is defined as knowledge arising through paramasha, i.e., the knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle which resides in the minor (paksadharmata) and is invariably associated with the major (Vyapti). Like the Aristotelian syllogism, the Indian inference has three terms. The major, the minor and the middle are here called Sadhya paksa and linga or hetu respectively. We known that smoke is invariably associated which fire (vyapti) and if we see smoke in a hill we conclude that there must be fire in that hill. Hill is the minor term, fire is the major term; smoke is the middle term. From the presence of in the hill as qualified by the knowledge that wherever there is smoke there is fire, we proceed to infer the pressure of fire in the hill. This is inference; the following is a typical Nyaya syllogism:
The third kind of valid cognition is Upamiti and its means is called Upamana. It is knowledge derived from comparison and roughly corresponds to analogy. It has been defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity. For example a man who has never seen a gawaya or a wild cow and does not known what it is, is told by a person that a wild cow is an animal like a cow, subsequently comes across a wild cow in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow, then his knowledge is due to Upamana. He has heard the world ‘gavaya’ and has been told that it is like a cow and now he himself sees the object denoted by the world ‘gavaya’ and recognizes it to be so.
Hence upamana is just the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by that name. It is produced by the knowledge of similarity because a man recognizes a wild cow as gavaya when he perceived its similarity to the cow and remembers the destruction that a gavaya is an animal like a cow. The Buddhists reduce Upamana to perception and testimony. The samkhya and the Vaishesika reduce it to inference. The Jainas reduce it to recognition or pratyabhijna. The Mimamsaka recognize it as a separate source of knowledge but their account of it is different from that of Nyaya.
The fourth kind of valid knowledge is shabda or Agama or authoritative verbal testimony. It means is also called shabda. It is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person (aptavakya) and consists in understanding its meaning. A sentence is defined as a collection of words and a word is defined as that which is potent to convey its meaning. The power in a word to convey its meaning comes, according to ancient Nyaya from God convention. Testimony is always personal. It is based on the worlds of a trustworthy persons who always space the truth are valid others are not. A word is a potent symbol which signifies an object and a sentence is a collection of words. But a sentence in order to be intelligible must conform to certain conditions. These conditions are four akansha, yogyaata, sanmidhi and tatparya.
The first is mutual implication or expectancy. The words of a sentence are interrelated and stand in need of one another in order to express a complete sense. The second condition is that the words should possess fitness to convey the sense and should not contradict the meaning. The third condition is the close proximity of words to one another. The fourth condition is the intention of the speaker if the words are ambiguous. The Nyaya admits only these four pramanas. Arthapatti or implication is reduced to inference. Abhava or non existence which also is regarded as a separate pramana by Bhatta Mimamsa is reduced here to perception or inference.
Question : Nature and kinds of pratyaksya according to Nyaya.
(2005)
Answer : In Nyaya philosophy perception, inference, comparison or analogy and verbal testimony are the four kinds of valid knowledge. Gautam defines perception as non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense organs with the objects, which is not associated with a name and which is well fined. This definition of perception excludes divine and yogic perception which is not generated by the intercourse of the sense organs with the objects. Hence Visvanatha has defined perception as direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any there cognition. This definition includes ordinary as well as extra-ordinary perception and excludes inference, comparison and testimony.
Perception is a kind of knowledge and is the attribute of the self. Ordinary perception presupposes the sense organs the objects, the manas and the self and their usual contacts. The self comes into contact with the manas, the manas with the sense organs and the sense organs with the objects. The contact of the sense organs with the objects is not possible unless the manas first come into contact with the sense organs, and the contact of the manas with the sense organs is not possible unless the self comes into contact with the manas. Hence sense contact and the self manas contact. The Naiyayaika maintains two stages in perception. The first is called indeterminate or nirvikalpa and the second, determinate or Savikalpa.
They are not two different kinds of perception, but only the earlier and the later stages in the same complex proceeds of perception. Perception is unassociated with a name which means indeterminate and it is well-defined which means determinate. All perception is determinate but it is necessarily preceded by an earlier stage when it is indeterminate. Perception may be ordinary (lauikka) or extraordinary (alaukika). When the sense-organs come into contact with the objects perceived to them in the usual why we have Laukika perception. And if the contact of the sense-organs with the objects is in an unusual way, if the objects are not ordinarily present to the senses but are conveyed to them through an extra ordinary medium, we have Alaukika perception. Ordinary perception is of two types, internal and external, and extraordinary is of three types Samanyalakshnan, Jnanalaksana and Yogaj.Question : State and discuss the nature and kinds of Dravyas according to Vaishesikas.
(2005)
Answer : According to Vaishesika substance or dravya is defined as the substratum where actions and qualities inhere and which is the coexistent material cause of the composite things produced from it. Substance signifies the self subsistence, the absolute and independent nature of things. The category of substance at once unfolds the pluralistic realism of this system. Substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. Without substance we cannot have qualities and action for they cannot hang loose in the air, but must be contained somewhere. Substance is the basis of qualities and actions, actual or potential, present or future. Nor can substance be defined apart from qualities and actions. Ultimate substances are eternal, independent and individual and are either infinite or infinitesimal.
All compound substances which are made parts and arise out of the simple ultimate substances are necessarily transient and impermanent and subject to production and destruction. But simple ultimate substances are eternal and not subject to production and destruction. The dravyas are nine and include material as well as spiritual substances. The Vaishesika philosophy is pluralistic and realistic but not materialistic since it admits spiritual substances. The nine substances are:
(1) earth (2) water, (3) fire (4) air, ether (6) time (7) space (8) spirit (9) mind or the internal organ.
Earth, water, fire and air really signify not the compound transient objects made of them but the ultimate elements the supersensible eternal part less unique atoms which are individual and infinitesimal. Ether is not atomic but infinite and eternal. These five are called elements and are physical. Each of them possesses a peculiar quality of earth, water, fire; air and ether are smell, taste, colour, touch and sound respectively which are sensed by the fire external senses. The external senses are constituted by them- the sense of small is constituted by the elements of earth and so on. Time and space, like ether, are one each, eternal and all pervading.
They are imperceptible and infinite substances and are part less and indivisible. They are conventionally spoken of as having parts and divisions. It is the cause of our cognitions of part, present and future and of younger and older. Space is the cause of our cognitions of east and west, here and there, near and far and is different from ether which is the substratum of the quality of sound. These are innumerable souls and each is an independent, individual, eternal and all pervading spiritual substance. It is the substratum of the quality of consciousness. Consciousness is not the essence of the self. It is not even an inseparable quality of the self. It is regarded as an adventitious attribute possessed by the self. It is adventitious because the self does not possess this quality during deep sleep.
The quality of consciousness must reside somewhere. It is not the property of the body or the senses or even mind. It resides in the self. Other important qualities possessed by the self are desire (ichchha) and volition (Yatna). Jnana, ichchha and Yatna are cognition, affection and cognition respectively. The fact that the self is the substance of these qualities is directly known through expressions; I know, ‘I am happy’, ‘I want to do this’ etc. Mind (manas) is also regarded as a substance. It is the internal sense. It is atomic, gives rise to compound objects. It is many and each is the organ through which the self comes into contact with the objects. Its existence is inferred from the fact that the self must perceive internal states of cognition, desire and conation through an internal sense, just as it perceives external objects through external senses. Moreover, in the perception of external objects the mind is selective and active. We do not perceive colour, touch, taste smell and sound simultaneously, even though all the external senses may be in contact with their objects.
Perception requires attention and attention is active turning of the mind towards the object of perception. Hence in perception, the self fix the manas on the object of perception with which the external sense is already in contact. Manas, therefore, is a substance and it is atomic and part less and can cause into contact with one sense only at one time. These are the nine substances of the Vaishesika, all of them are objective realities. Earth, water fire, air, and manas are atomic and eternal. The first four produce composite things; manas does not. Earth water, fire, air, and ether are the five gross elements. These and manas are Physical. Soul is spiritual. Time and space are objective and not subjective forms of experience. Ether, space, time and soul are all pervading and eternal. Atoms, minds and souls are infinite in number. Ether, space and time are one each.
Thus Vaishesika philosophy therefore, is pluralistic real which emphasizes that diversity is the soul of the universe. The category of vishesa or particularity is dealt with at length in this system and is regarded as the essence of things. The main business of vaishesika is to deal with the categories and to unfold its atomistic pluralism. A category is called padartha and the entire universe is reduced to six or seven padarthas. Originally the vaishesika believed in the six categories and the seventh that of abhava or negation was added later on.
Question : Nature and kind of anumana according to Nyaya.
(2004)
Answer : Anumana or inference, according to Nyaya is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is mediate and indirect and arises through a mark, the middle term (ling or hetu) which is invariably connected with the major term (Sadhya). It is knowledge (mana) which arises after (any) other knowledge. The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called paksadharmata. The invariable association of the middle term with the major term is called vyapti. The knowledge of pakshadharmata as qualified by vyapti is called paramarsha. And inference is defined as knowledge arising through paramersha, i.e., the knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle which resides in the minor and is invariably associated with the major. Like the Aristotelian syllogism, the Indian inference has three terms. The major, the minor and the middle are here called sadhya, paksa and linga or hetu respectively.
Inference is generally regarded as of two kinds Svartha and Parartha. In the former we do not require the formal statement of the different members of inference. It is a psychological process. The later, the parartha which is a syllogism, as to be presented in language and this has to be done only to convince others. Gautam speaks of three kinds of inference purvavat, Shesavat and Samanyatodrsta. The first two are based on causation and the last one on mere coexistence. A cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect and an effect is the invariable and unconditional consequent of a cause.
When we inter the unperceived effect from a perceived cause we have purvavat inference, e.g. when we infer future rain from dark clouds in the Sky. When we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived affect we have sensual inference, e.g., when infer part rain from the swift muddy flooded water of a river. When inference is based on causation but on uniformity of co-existence, it is called samanyatodrsta, e.g., when we infer cloven loafs of an animal by its horns.
Question : The Nyaya-Vishesika view of Samanya.
(2003)
Answer : Samanya is a class concept, class essence or universal. It is the common character of the things which fall under the same class. The samanya is more like the universal then like the genus. The genus stands for the class and includes the sub classes or species. The samanya stands, not for the class, but for the common characteristic of certain individuals and does not include the sub-classes. It is the universal by the possession of which different individuals are referred to as belonging to one class. It is called eternal one and residing in many. It is one, though the individuals in whom it resides are many. It is eternal, though the individuals in whom it inheres are subject to birth and death, production and destruction. It is common to many individuals. There is the class-essence of the universal of man called man-ness or humanity which inheres in all individual generality and particularity as relative to thought. But this does mean that the universal and the particular are mere subjective concepts in our mind. Both are objective realities. The system is staunchly realistic.
The universal has as much objective reality as the particular. It is not a subjective class-concept in our mind, but an objective eternal timeless entity shared by many particulars and corresponding to a general idea or class-concept in our mind. The universals reside in substances, qualities and actions. They are of two kinds, higher and lower. The higher generality is that of being (satta). It includes everything and itself is not included in anything. Every other generality is lower because it covers a limited number of things and cannot cover all things. A universal cannot subsist in another universal; otherwise an individual may be a cow and a horse at the same time. Only one universal subsists in all individual may be a may a cow and a horse at the same time. Only one universal subsists in all individuals of a class. What subsists in one individual only, like ether ness? Subsisting in ether is not a universal. Conjunction inheres in many substances, it conjoins, but it is not a universal since it is not eternal. Nonbeing is eternal and belongs to many things, but it is not a universal since it does no inhere in them.
The three views of realism, conceptualism and nominalism with which are familiar in western logic appear in Indian philosophy in the schools of Nyaya-Vaishasika, Jainism and Vedants and Buddhism respectively. Buddhistic apohavada is nominalism. According to it, the universals are only same and not realties. A cow is called a cow, not because it shares the universal cow ness, but because it is different from all objects which are not cow. A cow is therefore, means a not non-cow. There is no universal or a real; if it only a name with a negative connotation.
Question : Evaluate the Nyaya Vaishesika theory of the natur of Vyapti.
(2001)
Answer : Vyapti or invariable concomitance (Vyapti) is the nerve of inference. The invariable association of middle term with the major term is called Vyapti. The middle term is linga or hetu and the major term is Sadhya. The anumana is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is mediate and indirect and arises through a mark, the middle term which is invariably connected with the major term. It is knowledge which arises after other knowledge. The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called paksadharmata. The knowledge of paksadharngata as qualified by Vyapti is called paramarsha. And inference is defined as knowledge arising through paramasha, i.e., the knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle which resides in the minor (paksadharmata) and is invariably associated with the major (Vyapti).
The Indian inference has three terms. The major, the minor and the middle are here called Sadhya, paksa and linga or hetu respectively. We known that smoke is invariably associated with fire (Vyapti) and it we see smoke in a will we conclude that there must be fire in that hill. Hill is a minor term; fire is the major term; smoke is the middle term. From the presence of smoke in the hill as qualified by the knowledge that wherever there is smoke there is fire, we proceed to infer the presence of fire in the hill. This is inference. There are fire members in the Nyaya syllogism. The first is called Pratijna or proposition. It is the logical statement which is to be proved.
The second is Hetu or reason which states the reasons for the esablishment of the proposition. The third is called Udaharana which gives the universal concomitance together with an example. The fourth is Upanaya or the application of the universal concomitance to the present case. And the fifth is Nigamana or conclusion drawn from the preceding proposition. These fire propositions of the Indian syllogism are called members or avayavas. The following is a typical Naya syllogism.
The view that vyapti, the nerve of inference, was introduced by the Buddhist logician Dignnaga who was influenced by Greek thought is also wrong. Vyapti was not recognized much before Dinnaga, nor did he borrow his doctrine from Greece. It is more reasonable to explain the similarities between the two as due to a parallel development of thought. Indian logic has been a natural growth. There are five characteristics of the middle term:
The Charvaka School vehemently opposes inference and therefore vyapti also. It rejects the validity of vyapti and inference. Inference is said to be a mere leap in the dark. According to Charvaka philosophy we proceed here from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this, though some inference many turn out to be accidentally true. A general proposition may be true in perceived cases, but there is no guarantee that it will hold true even in unperceived cases. Deductive inference is vitiated by the fallacy of petitio principii. It is merely an argument in a circle since the conclusion is already contained in the major premise, the validity of the major premise of deductive inference.
But induction too is uncertain because it proceeds unwarrantedly from the known to the unknown. In order to distinguish true induction from simple enumeration, it is pointed out that the former, unlike the latter is based on a causal relationship which means invariable association or vyapti. Vyapti therefore is the nerve of all inference. But the Charvak challenges this universal and invariable relationship of concomitance and regards it as a mere guess work. Perception does not prove this vyapti. Nor can it be proved by inference. Testimony too cannot prove it, for firstly, testimony itself is not valid means of knowledge and secondly, if testimony processes Vyapti, inference would become dependent on testimony and then none would be able to infer anything by himself.
But the crude Charvaka position has been vehemently criticized by all systems of Indian philosophy all of which have maintained the validity of inference and Vyapti. To refuse the validity of inference from the empirical standpoint is to refuse to think and discuss. All thought all discussion, all doctrines; all affirmations and denials, all proofs and disproof are made possible by inference. The Charavaka view that perception is valid and vyapti is invalid is itself a result of inference. The Charvaka can understand others only through inference and make others understand him only through inference. Thoughts and ideas cannot be perceived, they can only be inferred.
Question : Nyaya Theory of causality.
(1999)
Answer : According to Nyaya theory of causation, a cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent and the effects are produced by the same cause. Plurality of causes is ruled out. The first essential characteristic of a cause is its antecedence; the fact that it should precede the effect. The second is its invariability; it must invariably precede the effect. The third is unconditionally or necessity; it must precede the effect. Unconditional antecedence is immediate and direct antecedence and excludes the fallacy of remote cause.
Thus we see that the Nyaya definition of a cause is the same as that in western inductive logic. Hume defines a cause as an invariable antecedent. J.S.Mill defines it as an unconditional and invariable antecedent. Carveth Read points out that it includes immediacy. A cause, therefore, is an unconditional, immediate and invariable antecedent of an effect. Nyaya recognizes five binds of accidental antecedents which are not real causes. Firstly, the qualities of a cause are mere accidental antecedents. The colour of a potter’s staff is not the cause of a pot. Secondly, the cause of a cause or a remote cause is not unconditional. The potter’s father is into the cause of a pot.
Thirdly, the co-effects of a cause are themselves not causally related. The sound produced by the potter’s staff is not the cause of a pot, though it may invariably precede the pot. Night and day are not causally related. Fourthly, eternal substances like space are not unconditional antecedents. Fifthly, unnecessary things like the potter’s are not unconditional antecedences; though the potter’s are may be invariable present when the potter is making a pot, yet it is not the cause of the pot. A cause must be an unconditional and necessary antecedent. Naya emphasizes the sequence view of causality. Cause and effect are never simultaneous. Plurality of causes is also wrong because causal relation is reciprocal. The same effect cannot be produced by any other cause. Each effect has its distinctive features and has only one specific cause. Further like western logic. The Nyaya regards a cause as the sum total of the conditions positive and negative, taken together.
Question : Nyaya view of self2002, Civil service.
(1999)
Answer : In Nyaya philosophy the law of causation is subservient to the law of Karma. The Nyaya like the Vaishesika believes in teleological creation. The material causes of this universe are the eternal atoms of earth, water, fire and air and the efficient cause is God. The infinite individual souls are co-eternal with atoms. And God is co-eternal with atoms and souls and is external to both. Nyaya advocates atomism, spiritualism, theism, realism and pluralism. Creation means combination of atoms and destruction means dissolution of these combinations through the motion supplied to or withdrawn from the atoms by the Unseen power working under the guidance of God.
The innumerable eternal atoms and the innumerable eternal bowls are both beyond creation and destruction. God can neither create them nor destroy them. God is not the real creator as he is not the material cause of this universe. And though he is called the ratter of the universe being regarded as the efficient cause, the efficiency belongs to the unseen power. The view of causation is asatkaryavada because the different combinations of atoms are regarded as new creations, as real creations having the distinctive features of their own and adding new properties to reality. The individual soul is regarded as the substratum of the quality of consciousness which is not its essence but only an accidental property.
The soul is a real knower, a real enjoyer and a real active agent and an eternal substance. It is not transcendental consciousness and it is different from God who is the supreme soul. Cognitions, affections and conations are the attributes of the soul which is one and all pervading. Each soul has its manas during its empirical life and is separated from it in liberation. It is distinct from the body, the senses and the mind (manas). Bondage is due to ignorance and Karma. Liberation is due to knowledge and destruction of Karma. The Vedas are the work of God and therefore claim absolute authority.
Question : Discuss the nature and structure of inference according to the Nyaya Philosophy and explain the importance of the various steps of pararthanumana.
(1998)
Answer : Anumana or internee is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is mediate and indirect and arises through a mark the middle term (linga or hetu) which is invariably connected with the major term (Sadhya). It is knowledge. Invariable concomitance (Vyapti) is the nerve of inference. The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called Paksadharmata. The invariable association of the middle term with the major term is called vyapti. The knowledge of paksdharmata as qualified by vyapti is called paramarsha. And inference is defined as knowledge arising through paramarsha, i.e., the knowledge of the presence of the major in the mirror through the middle which resides in the minor (paksadharmata) and is invariably associated with the major (vyapti). Like the Aristotetian syllogism, the Indian inference has three terms. The major, the minor and the middle are here called Sadhya, pakasa and ling or hetu respectively. We know that smoke is invariably associated with fire (Vyapti) and if we see smoke in a hill we conclude what these must be fire in that will. Hill is the minor term; fire is the major term; smoke is the middle term. From the presence of smoke in the hill as qualified by the knowledge that wherever there is smoke there is fire, we proceed to infer the presence of fire in the hill.
This is inference. Indian logic does not separate deduction from induction. Inference is a complex process involving both. Indian logic also rejects the verbal view of logic. It studies thought as such and not the forms of thought alone. The formal and the material logic are blended here. Verbal form farms no integral part of the inference. This becomes clear from the division of inference into svartha (for oneself) and parartha (for others). In the former we do not require the formal statement of the different members of inference. It is a psychological process. The latter the pararha which is a syllogism has to be presented in language and this has to be done only to convince others.
There are five members in the Nyaya syllogism. The first is called Pratijna or proposition. It is the logical statement which is to be proved. It is the logical statement which is to be proved. The second is Hetu or reason which states the reason for the establishment of the proposition. The third is called Udharana which gives the universal concomitance together with an example. The fourth is Upanaya or the application of the universal concomitance to the present case. And the fifth is Nigamana or conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions. These five propositions of the Indian syllogism are called members or Avayava. The following is a typical Nyaya Syllogism:
If we compare it with the Aristotelean syllogism which has only three propositions, we will find that this Nyaya syllogism corresponds to the Barbara mood of the first figure which is the strongest mood of the strongest figure. Though the Nyaya Syllogism has five and the Aristotelian has three propositions, the terms in both are only three-the sadhys or the middle. Out of the five propositions, two appear redundant and we may easily leave out either the first two or the last two which are essentially the same. The first coincides with the fifth and the second with the fourth. If we unite the last two, the first three propositions correspond with the conclusion, the minor premise and the major premise respectively or, if we omit the first two, the last three propositions correspond to the major premise, the minor premise and the conclusion of the Aristotelian syllogism. Hence if we leave out the first two members of the Nyaya syllogism which are contained in the last two, we find that it resembles the Aristolelian syllogism in the first figure:
But there are certain real differences between the Nyaya and the Aristotelian syllogism apart from the nominal difference between the numbers of the proposition in each. The Aristotelian syllogism is only deductive and formal, while the Nyaya syllogism is deductive inductive and formal material. The Nyaya rightly regards deduction and formal as inseparably related as two aspects of the same process- the truth now realized in western logic. Inference, according to Nyaya, is neither from the universal to the particular nor from the particular to the universal, but from the particular to the particular through the universal.
The example is a special feature of the Nyaya syllogism and illustrated the truth and the universal major premise is the result of a real induction based deduction cannot be really separated. Again, while in the Aristotelean syllogism the major and the minor terms stand apart in the premises though they are connected by the middle term with each other, in the Nyaya syllogism all the three terms stand synthesized in the Upanaya. Again, while the Aristotelian syllogism is verbalistic, the Nayaya recognizes the fact that verbal form is not. The essence of inference is required only to convince others. Some people have suggested that the Nyaya syllogism is influenced by Greek thought. But it is absolutely false; we find the development of the Nayas inference before Arisotle.
These are also certain fundamental differences between the two views and the view of Nyaya is accepted as better by the modern western logicians also. The view that vyapti, the nerve of inference, was introduced by the Buddhist logician Dignaga who was influenced by Greek. It is more reasonable to explain the similarities between the two as due to a parallel development of thought. Indian logic has been a natural growth. There are five characteristics of the middle term :
Question : Padartha.
(1997)
Answer : The Vaishesika system is regarded as conducive to the study of all system. Its main business is to deal with the categories and to unfold its atomistic pluralism. A category is called padartha and the entire universe is reduced to six or seven padarthas. Padartha literally means the meaning of world or the object signified by a world. All objects of knowledge or all realties come under padartha. Padartha means an object which can be thought and named. The Aristotelean categories are the mere modes of predication and represent a logical classification of predicates. The Kantian categories are the moulds of the understanding under which things have to pass before becoming knowable.
The Hegelian categories are the dynamic stage in the development of thought which is identified with reality. The Vaishesika categories are different from them all. While the Aristotelean categories are a logical classification of predicates only, the vaishesika categories are were moulds of the understanding. They are not like the Hegelian categories which are like dynamic stages in the development of thought. Hegel’s is a philosophy of absolute idealism, a dynamic and concrete identify in difference. The vaishesika system is a pluralistic realism, a philosophy of identity and difference, which emphasizes that the heart of reality consists in difference. It is a mere catalogue of the knowable, an enumeration of the diverse realities without any attempt to synthesize them.
Originally the Vaishesika believes in the six categories and the seventh that of abhava or negation was added later on. Though Vedanta himself speaks of abhava, yet it does not give it the stages of a category to which it was raised only by the later vaishesikas. The Vaishesika divides all existent realties which are all objects of knowledge into two classes-bhava or being and abhava or non being. Six categories come under bhava and the seventh is abhava. All knowledge necessarily points to an object beyond and independent of it. All that is real comes under the object of knowledge and is called a padartha. The seven padarthas care (1) substance (2) quality (3) action (4) generality (5) particularity (6) inherence (7) nonbeing
Question : Alauikika Pratyaksa.
(1996)
Answer : Knowledge, according to Nyaya philosophy is produced in the soul when it comes into contact with the not soul. It is the adventitious property of the soul which is generated in it by the object. If the generating conditions are sound, knowledge is valid. Gautama defines perception as non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense organs with the object, which is not associated with a name and which is well defined. But more importantly perception is direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. Perception may be ordinary (laukika) or extraordinary (alaukika). When the sense organs come into contact with the object present to them in the usual way, we have Laukika perception. And if the contact of the sense organs with the objects is in an unusual way i.e., if the objects are not ordinarily present to the senses but are conveyed to them through an extraordinary medium, we have Alaukika perception or pratyaksha.
Extra-ordinary perception is of three kinds; samanyalaksana, jnanalaksana and yogaj pratyaksha. Samanyalaksana perception is the perception of the universals. According to Nyaya, the universals are a distinct class of realities. They inhere in the particular which belong to different classes on account of the different universals inhering in them. An individual belong to a particular because the universal of that class inheres in it. Thus a cow becomes a cow because it has the universal cow ness inhering in it. Ordinarily we perceive only the particulars and not the universals of that class inhere in it. Hence the Nyaya maintains that the universals are perceived extraordinarily whenever we perceive a particular cow we first perceive the universal cow ness inhering in it. The second kind of extraordinary perception is called Jnanalakshana perception. It is the complicated perception through association. Sometimes different sensations become associated and form one integrated perception. Here object is not directly presented to a sense organ but is revived in memory through the partly cognition of it and is perceived through representation. The third kind of extraordinary perceptions are called yogaja perception. This is the intuitive and immediate perception of all objects, art, present, and future, possessed by the Yogins through the power of meditation. It is like the Kevalajnana of the Jainas, the Bodhi of the Buddhists, the kaivalya of the Sankya yoga and the Aparokshanubhuti of the vedantins. It is intuitive, supra sensuous and supra relational.
Question : Modes of perceptions according to Nyaya.
(1995)
Answer : Nyaya defines perception as non enormous cognition which is production by the intercourse of the sense organs with the objects, which is not associated with a name and which is well defined. The Naiyayika maintains two stages in perception. The first is called indeterminate or nirvikalpa and the second, determinate or savikalpa. They are not two different kinds of perception, but only the earlier and the later stages in the same complex process of perception. These two stages are recognized by Gautama in his definition of perception. Perception is unassociated with a name which means indeterminate and it is well defined which means determinate. According to Nyaya all perception is determinate because it is perpetual knowledge or perpetual Judgment. Sensation is the material and the conception is the form of knowledge. Perception again may be ordinary or extraordinary. When the sense organs come into contact with the objects present to them in the usual way, we have Laukika perception. And if the contact of the sense organs with the objects is in unusual way, if the objects are not ordinarily present to the sense but are conveyed to them through an extraordinary medium, we have Alunkika perception.
Ordinary perception is of two kinds internal and external. In internal perception, the mind which is the internal organ comes into concept with the physical states and process like cognition affection, derive, pain, pleasure, aversion etc. External perception takes place with the five external organs of sense come into contact with the external objects. Extraordinary perception is also of three kinds- Samanyalaksna, Jnanna lakshna and Yogaja. Samanyalakshna perception is the perception of the complicated perception through association of all objects, present past and future, possessed by the Yogis through the power of meditation.
Question : What is meant by hetvavhasa in Indian Logic? Is it formal or material? What according to Nyaya are its kinds? Explain.
(1995)
Answer : In Indian logic a fallacy is called hetvabhara. It means that the middle term appears to be a reason but is not a valid reason. All fallacies are materials fallacies. There are five characteristics of a valid middle term. When these are violated we have fallacies. Five kinds of fallacies are recognized:
According to the Nyaya the middle term has five characteristics:
Thus it is quite obvious that the chief value of Nyaya lies in its epistemology logic which has influenced all schools of Indian philosophy.
Question : Give an account of the chief tenets of Vaisesika metaphysics.
(1995)
Answer : The Vaishesika system is next to Samkhya in origin and is of greater antiquity than the Nyaya. The word is derived from ‘Vishesa’ which means particularity of distinguishing features or distinction. The vaishesika philosophy therefore, is pluralistic realism which emphasizes that diversity is the soul of the universe. The category of vishesa or particularity deals with at length in this system, and is regarded as the essence of things. The Vaishesika system is regarded as conducive to the study of all system. Its main business is to deal with the categories and to unfold its atomistic pluralism. A category is called Padartha and the entire universe is reduced to six or seven padarthas.
Padartha Literally means the meaning of a ‘word’, the object signified by a word’. All objects of knowledge or all reals come under padartha. Padartha means an object which can be thought and named. The Aristotelian categories are mere modes of predication and represent a logical classification of predicates. The Kantian categories are the mould of the understanding under which things have to pass before becoming knowable. The Aristotelian categories are a logical classification of predicates only, the Vaishsika categories are a metaphysical classification of all knowable objects or of all reals. The Vaishesika system is a pluralistic realism, a philosophy of identity and difference, which emphasizes that the heart of reality consists in difference. It is a more catalogue of the knowables, an enumeration of the diverse reals without any attempt to synthesize them. Originally the Vaishetika believed in the six categories and the seventh that of abhave or negation was added later on.
The vaishesika divides all existent reals which are all objects of knowledge into two classes, bhava or being and abhava or non-being. Six categories come under bhava and the seventh is abhava. All knowledge necessarily points to an object beyond and independent of it. All that is real comes under the object of knowledge and is called a padartha. The seven Padarthas are: (1) substance (dravya) (2) Quality (guna) (3) action (karma) (4) generality (samanya) (5) particularity (Vusgesa) (6) Inherence (Samavaya) (7) Non being (abhava).
Dravya (Substance) is defined as the substratum where actions and qualities inhere and which is the coexistent material cause of the composite thing produced from it. Substance signifies the self subsistence, the absolute and independent nature of thing. The category of substance at once unfolds the pluralistic realism of this system. Substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. Without substance we cannot have qualities and actions for they cannot hang loose in the air, but must be contained somewhere. Substance is the basis of qualities and actions, actual or potential, present or future. The dravyas are nine and include material as well as spiritual substances. The nine substances are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, spirit mind or the internal organ.
The second category is guna or quality. Unlike substance, it cannot exist independently by itself and possesses no quality or action. It inheres in a substance and depends for its existence on the substance and is not a constitutive cause of anything. It is called an independent reality because it can be conceived, thought and named independently of a substance where it inheres. The qualities are therefore called objective entities. Kanada mentions seventeen qualities to which seven more are added by Prashastapada, These twenty four qualities are recognized by the Nyaya-Vaishesika school.
The third category is Karma or action. Like quality, it belongs to and inheres in a substance and cannot exits separately from it. But while a quality is a static and a permanent feature of a substance, an action is a dynamic and transient feature of it. The fourth category is Samanya or generality. It is class concept, class-essence or universal. It is the common character of the thing which falls under the same class. The Samanya is more like the universal than like the genus. The genus stands for the class and includes the sub-class or species. The samanya stands not for the class, but for the common characteristic of certain individuals and does not include the subclasses. It is the universal by the possession of which different individuals are refused to as belonging to one class. The fifth category is vishesa or particularity. It enables us to perceive things as different from one another. Every individual is a particular, a single and a unique thing different from all other. It has got a uniqueness of its own which constitutes its particularity. It is opposed to generality. Generality is inclusive, particularity is exclusive, Generality forms the basis of assimilation; particularity forms the basis of discrimination. It is very important to remember that the composite objects of this world which we generally call particular objects are not real particulars according to Nyaya- Vaishesika.
The sixth category is Samavaya or inseparable eternal called inherence. It is different from conjunction or samyoga which is a separable and transient relation and is a quality. Samavaya is an independent category. Kanada calls it the relation between cause and effect. Prashasastpada defines it as the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained, and being the basis of the idea, “this is that”. The things related by Samanaya are inseparably connected. It is eternal because its production would involve infinite regress. It is imperceptible and is inferred from the inseparable relation of two things.
The seventh category is Abhava or non-existence. Kanada does not mention it as a separate category. It is added afterwards. The first six categories are positive. This is negative. The other categories are regarded as absolute, but this category is relative in its conception. Absolute negation is impossibility, a pseudo-idea. Negation necessarily from the object known which exists independently of that knowledge and necessarily points to some object, similarly knowledge of negation is different from the thing negated and necessarily points to source object which is negated.
